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Nigerian Civil War
Date 1967–1970 Location Southern Nigeria Result Federal government victory
Combatants
Nigerian federal government	Republic of Biafra
Commanders
Yakubu Gowon	Odumegwu Ojukwu
Casualties
200,000 soldiers and civilians	Estimated 1,000,000 soldiers and civilians

The Nigerian Civil War, also known as the Biafran War, July 6, 1967 – January 13, 1970, was a political conflict caused by the attempted secession of the southeastern provinces of Nigeria as the self-proclaimed Republic of Biafra.

Contents 1 Causes of the conflict 2 Military coup 3 Breakaway 4 Civil War 5 Stalemate 6 War's End 7 Aftermath and legacy 8 Notes 9 Bibliography 10 External links

The conflict was the result of economic, ethnic, cultural and religious tensions among the various peoples of Nigeria. Like many other African nations, Nigeria was an artificial construct initiated by European powers, which had neglected to account for religious, linguistic, and ethnic differences. Nigeria, which won independence from Britain in 1960, had at that time a population of 60 million people consisting of nearly 300 differing ethnic and cultural groups.

Of the ethnic groups that made up Nigeria, the largest was the largely Muslim Hausa in the north, followed by the Yoruba in the half-Christian, half-Muslim southwest, and the Igbo in the predominantly Christian southeast. With the independence of Nigeria, a political alliance was forged between the leading Hausa and Igbo political parties, which ruled Nigeria from 1960 to 1966. This alliance excluded the Yoruba, while the Igbos were considered by many to be the main beneficiaries of the alliance, taking most of the top jobs and leading business opportunities in the young country.

The Yoruba westerners had supported a left-leaning, reformist party, the Action Group, which was antipathetic to the conservative northern Muslim bloc. A "palace coup" by conservative elements in the west led to the formation of a more conservative Yoruba party, the NNDP, which was prepared to go into alliance with the Hausa northerners. This new political alliance excluded the Igbo-dominated east from power, and threatened to roll back the gains of the Igbo elite.

The elections of 1965 witnessed the alliance of the Nigerian National Alliance of the Muslim north and the conservative elements in the west, against the United Progressive Grand Alliance of the Christian east and the progressive elements among the westerners. The Alliance of north and west won a crushing victory under Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. There were many claims of widespread electoral fraud.^{[citation needed]}

Claims of electoral fraud were the ostensible reason for a military coup on January 15, 1966, led by Igbo junior Army officers, mostly majors and captains. This coup resulted in General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, an Igbo and head of the Nigerian Army, taking power as President, becoming the first military head of state in Nigeria. The coup itself failed, as Ironsi rallied the military against the plotters. Ironsi then instituted military rule, alleging that the democratic institutions had failed and that, while he was defending them, they clearly needed revision and clean-up before reversion back to democratic rule. The coup, despite its failure, was perceived as having benefited mostly the Igbos because all but one of the five coup plotters were Igbos, and Ironsi, himself an Igbo, was thought to have promoted many Igbos in the Army at the expense of Yoruba and Hausa officers.^[1] On 29 July 1966, the Northerners executed a counter-coup. This coup was led by Lt. Col. Murtala Mohammed. It placed Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon into power.^[2] Ethnic tensions due to the coup and counter-coup increased and led, in September 1966, to the large-scale massacres of Christian Igbos living in the Muslim north.

The discovery of vast oil reserves in the Niger River delta, a sprawling network of rivers and swamps at the southernmost tip of the country, had tempted the southeast to annex the region in order to become economically self-sufficient. However, the exclusion of easterners from power made many fear that the oil revenues would be used to benefit areas in the north and west rather than their own. Prior to the discovery of oil Nigeria's wealth derived from agricultural products from the south, and minerals from the north. The north, up until around 1965, had had low-level demands to secede from Nigeria and retain its wealth for northerners. These demands seemed to cease when it became clear that oil in the south east would become a major revenue source. This further fuelled Igbo fears that the northerners had plans to strip eastern oil to benefit the North.

History of Nigeria

Early history Migration & settlements History before 1500 First states (1500-1800) Igbo and Savannah states Colonization (1800-1960) 1960-1979 Independence, military rule, and civil war Civil War (1967-1970) 1979-1999 Second republic, more military rule (1999-present) Return of democracy

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The military governor of the Igbo-dominated southeast, Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, citing the northern massacres and electoral fraud, proclaimed with southern parliament the secession of the south-eastern region from Nigeria as the Republic of Biafra, an independent nation on May 30, 1967. Although there was much sympathy in Europe and elsewhere, only four countries recognized the new republic.

Several peace accords especially the one held at Aburi, Ghana (the Aburi Accord) collapsed and the shooting war followed. Ojukwu managed at Aburi to get agreement to a confederation for Nigeria, rather than a federation. He was warned by his advisers that this reflected a failure to understand the difference on the side of Gowon, and that it would be revoked. When it was he regarded this as a failure of Gowon and the Military Government to honour their agreements, and that he was acting in accord with the agreement. His advisers, meanwhile, felt that Gowon had enacted as much of Aburi as was politically feasible and that Gowon had acted in the spirit of Aburi.^[3]

The Nigerian government launched a "police action" to retake the secessionist territory.The war began on July 6, 1967 when Nigerian Federal troops advanced in two columns into Biafra. The right-hand Nigerian column advanced on the town of Nsukka which fell on July 14, while the left-hand column made for Garkem, which was captured on July 12. But the Biafrans responded with an offensive of their own when on July 9, the Biafran forces moved west into the Mid-Western Nigerian state across the Niger river, passing through Benin City to reach Ore just over the state boundary on August 21, just 130 miles east of the Nigerian capital of Lagos. Although Benin City was retaken by the Nigerians on September 22, the Biafrans succeeded in their primary objective to tie down as many Nigerian Federal troops as they could. Four battalions of the Nigerian 2nd Infantry Division were needed to drive the Biafrans back and eliminate their territorial gains made during the offensive. But the Nigerians were repulsed three times and lost thousands of troops as they tried to cross the Niger during October.

However reorganization of the Nigerian forces, the reluctance of the Biafran army to attack again, and the effects of a naval, land and air blockade of Biafra led to a change in the balance of forces. The Swedish eccentric, Count Carl Gustav von Rosen, also led a flight of MiniCOINs in action; his BAF (Biafran Air Force) consisted of three Swedes and two Biafrans.

The Nigerians then settled down to a period of a siege by blockading Biafra. Amphibious landings by the Nigerian marines led by Major Isaac Adaka Boro captured the Niger Delta cities of Bonny, Okrika and Port Harcourt on July 26, and the port of Calabar on October 18 by elements of the Nigerian 3rd Marine Commando Division. In the north, Biafran forces were pushed back into their core Igbo territory, and the capital of Biafra, the city of Enugu, was captured by Nigerian forces belonging to the 1st Infantry Division on October 4. The Biafrans continued to resist in their core Igbo heartlands, which were soon surrounded by Nigerian forces.

From 1968 onward, the war fell into a form of stalemate, with Nigerian forces unable to make significant advances into the remaining areas of Biafran control. But another Nigerian offensive from April to June 1968 began to close the ring around the Biafrans with further advances on the two northern fronts and the capture of Port Harcourt on May 19, 1968. The blockade of the surrounded Biafrans led to a humanitarian disaster when it emerged that there was widespread civilian hunger and starvation in the besieged Igbo areas. The Biafran government claimed that Nigeria was using hunger and genocide to win the war, and sought aid from the outside world. A Nigerian commission, including British doctors from the Liverpool University School of Tropical Medicine, visited Biafra after the war^[4] and concluded that the evidence of deliberate starvation was overplayed, caused by confusion between the symptoms of starvation and various tropical illnesses. While they did not doubt that starvation had occurred, it was less clear to what extent it was a result of the Nigerian blockade or the restriction of food to the civilians (to make it available to the military) by the Biafran government ^[3]

Many volunteer bodies organised blockade-breaking relief flights into Biafra, carrying food, medicines, and sometimes (according to some claims) weapons.^[5] More common was the claim that the arms-carrying aircraft would closely shadow aid aircraft, making it more difficult to distinguish between aid aircraft and military supply aircraft.^[5] The Nigerian government also claimed that the Biafran government was hiring foreign mercenaries to extend the war. Nigeria also used 'mercenaries', in the form of Egyptian pilots for their air force MiG 17 fighters and Il 28 bombers. The Egyptians conscripts frequently attacked civilian rather than military targets, bombing numerous Red Cross shelters.^[5]

Bernard Kouchner was one of a number of French doctors who volunteered with the French Red Cross to work in hospitals and feeding centres in besieged Biafra. The Red Cross required volunteers to sign an agreement, which was seen by some (like Kouchner and his supporters) as being similar to a gag order, that was designed to maintain the organisation's neutrality, whatever the circumstances. Kouchner and the other French doctors signed this agreement.

After entering the country, the volunteers, in addition to Biafran health workers and hospitals, were subjected to attacks by the Nigerian army, and witnessed civilians being murdered and starved by the blockading forces. Kouchner also witnessed these events, particularly the huge number of starving children, and when he returned to France, he publicly criticised the Nigerian government and the Red Cross for their seemingly complicit behaviour. With the help of other French doctors, Kouchner put Biafra in the media spotlight and called for an international response to the situation. These doctors, led by Kouchner, concluded that a new aid organisation was needed that would ignore political/religious boundaries and prioritise the welfare of victims. They created Médecins Sans Frontières in 1971 (Doctors Without Borders).^[6] The Biafran relief effort has been characterized as "an act of unfortunate and profound folly", as the aid to the rebels prolonged the war. These months of extra conflict resulted in many civilian deaths, estimated by one scholar at 180,000.^[7]

In June 1969, the Biafrans launched a desperate offensive against the Nigerians in their attempts to keep the Nigerians off-balance. They were supported by foreign mercenary pilots continuing to fly in food, medical supplies and weapons. Most notable of the mercenaries was Swedish Count Carl Gustav von Rosen who led five Malmö MFI-9 MiniCOIN small piston-engined aircraft, armed with rocket pods and machine guns. His force attacked Nigerian military airfields in Port Harcourt, Enugu, Benin City and Ughelli, destroying or damaging a number of Nigerian Air Force jets used to attack relief flights, including a few Mig-17's and three out of Nigeria's six Ilyushin Il-28 bombers that were used to bomb Biafran villages and farms on a daily basis. Although taken off-guard by the surprise Biafran offensive, the Nigerians soon recovered and held off the Biafrans long enough for the offensive to stall out. The Biafran air attacks did disrupt the combat operations of the Nigerian Air Force, but only for a few months.

The Nigerian federal forces launched their final offensive against the Biafrans on December 23, 1969 with a major thrust by the 3rd Marine Commando Division which succeeded in splitting the Biafran enclave into two by the end of the year. The final Nigerian offensive, named "Operation Tail-Wind", was launched on January 7, 1970 with the 3rd Marine Commando Division attacking, and supported by the 1st Infantry division to the north and the 2nd Infantry division to the south. The Biafran town of Owerri fell on January 9, and Uli fell on January 11. The war finally ended with the final surrender of the Biafran forces in the last Biafra-held town of Amichi on January 13, 1970. Only a few days earlier, Ojukwu fled into exile by flying by plane to the republic of Côte d'Ivoire, leaving his deputy Philip Effiong to handle the details of the surrender to Yakubu Gowon of the federal army.

The war cost Nigeria a great deal in terms of lives, money and its image in the world. It has been estimated that up to three million people may have died due to the conflict, most from hunger and disease. Reconstruction, helped by the oil money, was swift; however, the old ethnic and religious tensions remained a constant feature of Nigerian politics. Military government continued in power in Nigeria for many years, and people in the oil-producing areas claimed they were being denied a fair share of oil revenues^[8]. Laws were passed mandating that political parties could not be ethnically or tribally based; however, it has been hard to make this work in practice.

The Igbos felt that they had been deliberately displaced from government positions, because their pre-war posts were now occupied by other Nigerians (mostly Yoruba and Hausa-Fulani). When Igbo civil servants left to join similar posts in Biafra, their positions had been replaced; and when the war was over the government did not feel that it should sack their replacements, preferring to regard the previous incumbents as having resigned. This, however, has led to a feeling of an injustice. Further feelings of injustice were caused by Nigeria, during the war, changing its currency so that Biafran supplies of pre-war Nigerian currency were no longer honoured and then, at the end of the war, offering only N£20 to easterners on exchange of their Biafran currency. This was seen as a deliberate policy to hold back the Igbo middle class, leaving them with little wealth to expand their business interests.^[9]

On Monday 29 May 2000, The Guardian of Lagos reported that President Olusegun Obasanjo commuted to retirement the dismissal of all military persons who fought for the breakaway state of Biafra during the Nigerian civil war. In a national broadcast, he said that the decision was based on the principle that "justice must at all times be tempered with mercy."

The NGO Médecins Sans Frontières was created in 1971 as an aftermath of the war by Bernard Kouchner and other French doctors who had worked in besieged Biafra.

1. ^ This was despite the disconnect between Ironsi, an Igbo, having stopped an Igbo-led coup. It also ignored the fact that the army was largely composed of Northerners at the private level, but Igbos at the officer level, and thus promotions would have to draw upon a large body of Igbo officers
2. ^ Gowon was chosen as a compromise candidate. He was a Northerner, a Christian, from a minority tribe, and had a good reputation within the army.
3. ^ ^{a b} Ntieyong U. Akpan, The Struggle for Secession, 1966-1970: A Personal Account of the Nigerian Civil War.
4. ^ R. B. Alade, The Broken Bridge: Reflections and Experience of a Medical Doctor during the Nigerian Civil War
5. ^ ^{a b c} Shadows : Airlift and Airwar in Biafra and Nigeria 1967-1970, by Michael I. Draper (ISBN 1-902109-63-5)
6. ^ Bortolotti, Dan (2004). Hope in Hell: Inside the World of Doctors Without Borders, Firefly Books. ISBN 1-55297-865-6.
7. ^ Ian Smillie (1995), quoted in Alex de Waal, Famine Crimes: Politics & the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa, African Rights and the International African Institute, 1997, ISBN 0253211581, p. 77
8. ^ With reason. The pre-1966 tax-sharing agreements on mineral wealth was changed to favour the Federal government at the expense of the state. This agreement has, in the 1980s, been modified to further favour the Federal government.
9. ^ Ken Saro-Wiwa, On a darkling plain

• Shadows : Airlift and Airwar in Biafra and Nigeria 1967-1970, by Michael I. Draper (ISBN 1-902109-63-5)
• On Wings of War: My Life as a Pilot Adventurer, by Jan Zumbach
• Warfare of the 20th Century, by Christopher Chant; Chartwell Books, 1988.
• The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War, by Alexander A. Madiebo; Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1980.
• Ejibunu, Hassan Tai: Nigeria´s Delta Crisis: Root Causes and Peacelessness - EPU Research Papers: Issue 07/07, Stadtschlaining 2007

• Map of Nigerian Civil War
• Civil War in Nigeria (Biafra), 1967-1970
• The Nigerian Civil War - Marcus Garvey
• Wole Soyinka and the Nigerian Civil War
• The Nigerian Civil War: Causes, Strategies, And Lessons Learnt
• Short history and assessment of the MFI-9B "MiniCOIN" in Biafran air force service
• Nicknames, Slogans, Local and Operational Names Associated with the Nigerian Civil War
• Quick Kill in Slow Motion: The Nigerian Civil War
• A view of blunders in the Nigerian strategy
• The Nigerian Civil War: Causes, Strategies, And Lessons Learnt