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Hollingsworth v. Virginia
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided February 14, 1798
Full case name: Hollingsworth, et al. v. Virginia Citations: 3 U.S. 378; 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378; 1 L. Ed. 644; 1798 U.S. LEXIS 145
Holding
The President has no formal role in the ratification of Constitutional Amendments.
Court membership
Chief Justice: Oliver Ellsworth Associate Justices: James Wilson, William Cushing, James Iredell, William Paterson, Samuel Chase
Case opinions
Per curiam.
Laws applied
U.S. Const. art. V

Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798) ^[1], was a case in which the United States Supreme Court ruled early in America's history that the President of the United States has no formal role in the process of amending the United States Constitution.

While it is permissible, a Presidential signature is unnecessary. By the same logic, a President is powerless to veto a constitutional amendment which has been officially proposed to the states to ratify.

Further by the same logic, it is reasonable to infer that a state's governor is likewise officially uninvolved in the Federal constitutional amendment process.

Contents 1 Possible rationale 2 Summary 3 See also 4 References

In Hollingsworth v. Virginia, the United States Supreme Court offered no rationale for its holding. Although the Court held that a presidential signature was not necessary for valid ratification that holding is limited to the precise facts that were actually before the Court. The Court may have taken the position – as is likely – that the President has no constitutional power to sign, veto or pocket veto congressionally proposed amendments. But the Supreme Court nowhere expressed this position in its Hollingsworth opinion. Other rationales for Hollingsworth are also possible. For example, the Court may have taken the position that once ratified by the requisite number of States, an amendment or proposed amendment can no longer be challenged. The logic here is that "ratification" cures "defects". Alternatively, the rationale for Hollingsworth may have been that a Presidential proclamation of ratification in conclusive upon the courts notwithstanding arguable defects in the ratification process. See Luther v. Borden (1849). More importantly, in Hollingsworth, the proposed amendment was delivered to the President more than ten days prior to Congress's end of session adjournment. Under these circumstances, the absence of a presidential signature does not work a veto, but implies assent under the procedures laid out in Article I, even assuming they apply to the amendment process of Article V.

In short, Hollingsworth's holding is limited to its facts: no presidential signature is necessary for valid ratification when the proposed amendment was presented more than ten days prior to congressional adjournment, and the necessary number of States ratified, and the President proclaimed the ratification as effective. Thus, the precise question of whether or not a President could veto a proposed amendment was not addressed by the Hollingsworth holding, although this position was adopted as dicta in INS v. Chadha (1983). Similarly, Hollingsworth did not address the question of the necessity of a presidential signature in situations where the amendment was delivered to the President less than ten days prior to congressional adjournment.

• Tillman, Seth Barrett. A Textualist Defense of Article I, Section 7, Clause 3: Why Hollingsworth v. Virginia was Rightly Decided, and Why INS v. Chadha was Wrongly Reasoned, Texas Law Review, Vol. 83, pg 1265 (2005).
• Lawson, Gary S. Burning Down the House (and Senate): A Presentment Requirement for Legislative Subpoenas Under the Orders, Resolutions, and Votes Clause, Texas Law Review, Vol. 83, pg 1373 (2005).
• Tillman, Seth Barrett. The Domain of Constitutional Delegations under the Orders, Resolutions and Votes Clause: A Reply to Professor Gary S. Lawson, Texas Law Review, Vol. 83, pg 1389 (2005).

1. ^ 3 U.S. 378 (Full text of the decision courtesy of Findlaw.com)