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Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued March 30, 1994 Decided June 27, 1994
Full case name: Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District, Petitioner v. Louis Grumet, et al. Citations: 512 U.S. 687; 114 S. Ct. 2481; 129 L. Ed. 2d 546; 1994 U.S. LEXIS 4830; 62 U.S.L.W. 4665; 94 Cal. Daily Op. Service 4818; 94 Daily Journal DAR 8917; 8 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 359 Prior history: On writs of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of New York
Holding
A N.Y. statute that carved out a school district that followed village lines, which village was almost entirely composed of members of one religious group, was held to violate the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution.
Court membership
Chief Justice: William Rehnquist Associate Justices: Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg
Case opinions
Majority by: Souter (parts I, II-B, II-C, III) Joined by: Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Ginsburg Concurrence by: Souter (parts II (introduction), II-A) Joined by: Blackmun, Stevens, Ginsburg Concurrence by: Stevens Joined by: Blackmun, Ginsburg Concurrence by: O'Connor Concurrence by: Kennedy Dissent by: Scalia Joined by: Rehnquist, Thomas
Laws applied
U.S. Const., amend. I

Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994),^[1] was a case in the United States Supreme Court.

The State of New York created a school district that coincided with the boundaries of Kiryas Joel, a community of the Satmar Hasidim, a Hasidic Jewish community.

The court, in an opinion by Justice Souter, held that the funding of a school district designed to coincide with the neighborhood boundaries of a religious group constitutes an unconstitutional aid to religion. Souter concluded that "government should not prefer one religion to another, or religion to irreligion." Critics of this interpretation argue that it effectively changes the Constitution in a way never contemplated by the founders. However, this is a controversial and evolving area of jurisprudence.

Justice Scalia, in his dissent, acknowledged that the residents of this district are Satmars, but noted of the Satmar community:

[A]ll its residents also wear unusual dress, have unusual civic customs, and have not much to do with people who are culturally different from them ... On what basis does Justice Souter conclude that it is the theological distinctiveness rather than the cultural distinctiveness that was the basis for New York State's decision? The normal assumption would be that it was the latter, since it was not theology but dress, language, and cultural alienation that posed the educational problem for the children.

Scalia argued that the state's creation of the Satmar school district did not constitute impermissible aid to a religious group because it is directed to the Satmars in their capacity as a culture rather than their religious capacity. The Court was labeling as religion that which Justice Scalia would have put outside the definition of the word, asserting that the author of the majority opinion would "laud this humanitarian legislation if all of the distinctiveness of the students of Kiryas Joel were attributable to the fact that their parents were nonreligious commune dwellers, or American Indians, or Gypsies." Justice Scalia concludes that "[t]he creation of a special, one-culture school district for the benefit of those children would pose no problem. The neutrality demanded by the Religion Clauses requires the same indulgence towards cultural characteristics that are accompanied by religious belief."

• ↑ 512 U.S. 687 (Text of the opinion on Findlaw.com)