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Battle off Samar
Part of World War II, Pacific War
The escort carrier USS Gambier Bay, burning from earlier gunfire damage, is bracketed by a salvo from a Japanese cruiser (faintly visible in the background, center-right) shortly before sinking during the Battle off Samar.
Date October 25, 1944 Location The Philippines Result American victory
Combatants
United States	Empire of Japan
Commanders
Clifton Sprague	Takeo Kurita
Strength
"Taffy 3" 6 escort aircraft carriers, 3 destroyers, 4 destroyer escorts, 400 aircraft	Japanese Center Force 4 battleships, 6 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers, 11 destroyers
Casualties
2 escort carriers, 2 destroyers, 1 destroyer escort sunk over 1,000 casualties	3 heavy cruisers sunk, 3 more seriously damaged 1 destroyer sunk 1 more seriously damaged

v • d • e Philippines campaign (1944–45)
Leyte – Leyte Gulf – Ormoc Bay – Mindoro – Lingayen Gulf – Luzon – Cabanatuan – Bataan – Manila – Corregidor – Los Baños – Palawan – Visayas – Mindanao

The Battle off Samar was the final stage of the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the largest naval battle in history. The battle took place in the Philippine Sea near the Samar area of Leyte Island in the Philippines on October 25, 1944 and involved warships from the United States Navy against warships from the Imperial Japanese Navy. Lacking the ships and armament to stand up against an armored battle force, American destroyers, escort carriers and their aircraft engaged a superior Japanese force of battleships and cruisers. Although they suffered heavy casualties, the US units nevertheless inflicted sufficient damage and chaos to discourage the Japanese and make them withdraw.

Contents 1 Summary 2 Background 3 The forces 4 Battle 4.1 Taffy 3 comes under attack 4.2 US Destroyer counterattack 4.2.1 USS Johnston makes a stand 4.2.2 USS Samuel B. Roberts 4.2.3 USS Heermann 4.3 Carriers under attack 4.3.1 USS St. Lo 4.3.2 USS Kalinin Bay 4.4 Japanese take hits 4.5 Kurita withdraws 5 Aftermath 6 Presidential Unit Citation 7 References 7.1 Books 7.2 Reports 7.3 Web 7.4 Audio/visual media 7.5 Notes

In the battle, a large force of Japanese battleships, cruisers, and destroyers engaged a force of three US escort aircraft carrier task groups. The US naval forces were taken by surprise because they thought that Admiral Takeo Kurita's force had retreated the previous day. The main US force of fleet carriers and battleships, under the command of William Halsey, Jr., had left the area to attack a Japanese carrier force in what was actually a ruse by the Japanese to lure Halsey's heavy forces away from Leyte.

Unprepared to engage in a battle with large-gunned warships, Rear Admiral Clifton Sprague's escort carriers attempted to escape from the Japanese force while US destroyers, destroyer escorts, and carrier aircraft made repeated attacks on Kurita's ships. The escort carrier planes' ordnance was mostly high-explosive bombs and depth charges for their escort and support duties, rather than armour-piercing bombs and torpedoes which would have been much more effective against heavily armoured warships. Nonetheless, Sprague's planes pressed the attack and later continued to dive on enemy ships even though they were out of ammunition.

Two US destroyers, a destroyer escort, and an escort carrier were sunk by Japanese gunfire. Another US escort carrier was hit and sunk by a Kamikaze aircraft during the battle. Kurita's battleships were driven away from the engagement trying to avoid US destroyer torpedoes; they were unable to regroup in the chaos, while three cruisers were lost due to air attack and several other cruisers were damaged. Due to the ferocity of the US attacks, Kurita was convinced that he was facing a far superior force and withdrew from the battle area, ending the threat to the troop transports and supply ships.

The battle was one of the last major naval engagements between US and Japanese naval forces in World War II. After this, the Imperial Japanese Navy never again sailed to battle in such large force, but returned to Japan to remain largely inactive for the remainder of the war.

This battle is often depicted as one of the major "what-ifs" in World War II. If Kurita had continued the attack instead of withdrawing, it is likely that the US would have suffered heavy losses in troops and supplies, which would have delayed their capture of the Philippines. It is also likely that had Kurita’s and Halsey's forces met, that would have set the stage for the long awaited "decisive battle" where both sides would have finally been able to pit their largest battleships against each other.

The overall Japanese strategy at Leyte Gulf, a plan known as Shō-Go 1, called for Vice-Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa's fleet, known as Northern Force, to lure the United States Third Fleet — under Admiral William Halsey, Jr — away from the Allied landings on Leyte, using an apparently vulnerable force of carriers. The Allied landing forces, now lacking air cover, would then be attacked from the west by Japanese forces including Vice-Admiral Takeo Kurita's command, Center Force, which was based in Brunei. The plan called for Kurita to then enter Leyte Gulf and attack the Allied landing forces. Kurita's force included the battleships Yamato and Musashi, the largest battleships ever built.

In the lead-up to the battle, on the night of 23 October, two American submarines, USS Dace and USS Darter, spotted Kurita's Center Force entering the Palawan Passage. The two submarines submerged and fired torpedoes, sinking two cruisers and crippling a third. One of the sinking cruisers was the flagship of Center Force. Admiral Kurita had to swim for his life. Center Force was in chaos for hours before Kurita was finally rescued. Kurita transferred his flag to Yamato. The order was then given to continue on to Leyte Gulf.

Kurita's force entered the Sibuyan Sea, northwest of Leyte, on 24 October. In the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea, it was attacked by carrier aircraft and Musashi was sunk. When Kurita turned around, the American pilots assumed he was retreating, but he turned again and made his way through the San Bernardino Strait in the night.

The battle off Samar.

Yamato and a heavy cruiser, possibly Tone or Chikuma, in action off Samar.

The Japanese Center Force now consisted of Yamato, the battleships Nagato, Kongo, and Haruna; the heavy cruisers Maya, Chokai, Myoko, Haguro, Kumano, Suzuya, Chikuma, Tone; the light cruisers Yahagi, and Noshiro; and 13 destroyers.

They were pitted against an inferior force of three groups of light ships of the U.S. Seventh Fleet. Each had six small Casablanca-class escort carriers, and seven or eight lightly armed and unarmored destroyers and/or smaller destroyer escorts.

Admiral Thomas Sprague's Task Unit 77.4.1 ("Taffy 1") consisted of the escort carriers Sangamon, Suwannee, Santee, and Petrof Bay. (The remaining two escort carriers from Taffy 1, Chenango and Saginaw Bay, had departed for Morotai, Indonesia on October 24, carrying "dud" aircraft from other carriers for transfer ashore. They returned with replacement aircraft after the battle.)

Admiral Felix Stump's Task Unit 77.4.2 ("Taffy 2") consisted of Natoma Bay, Manila Bay, Marcus Island, Kadashan Bay, Savo Island, and Ommaney Bay.

Admiral Clifton Sprague's Task Unit 77.4.3 ("Taffy 3") consisted of Fanshaw Bay, St Lo, White Plains, Kalinin Bay, Kitkun Bay, and Gambier Bay.

Though each escort carrier was relatively small, carrying only 25 planes each, they added up to making available more than 500 planes in all. However, as they were intended to attack against ground forces and submarines, most were armed with machine guns, depth charges and high explosive and anti-personnel bombs, effective against troops, submarines or destroyers, but not against armoured battleships or cruisers.

Kurita's force passed through San Bernardino Strait at 03:00 on 25 October 1944 and steamed southwards along the coast of Samar, hoping that Halsey had taken the bait and moved most of his fleet away. This hope proved to have been amply fulfilled - Halsey had taken all his available strength northwards to strike the carriers of Ozawa's decoy force.

"Taffy 3" was the northernmost of the three units and the one which bore the brunt of Kurita's surface attack.

Rear Admiral Clifton “Ziggy” Sprague’s "Taffy 3" first learned of Kurita's presence when, at 06:37, Ensign Bill Brooks, piloting a Grumman Avenger on routine patrol, spotted the force 20 miles from Taffy 3 and attacked with depth charges. The Japanese had come upon Taffy 3 at 06:45, achieving complete tactical surprise. Kurita had not found the silhouettes of the tiny escort carriers in his identification manuals. He mistook the escort carriers for fleet carriers and assumed that he had the whole of the American Third Fleet under the guns of his battleships.

Taffy 3’s lookouts observed the antiaircraft fire to the north. Admiral Sprague was incredulous and demanded identification verification which arrived as the enemy battleships came in sight. Ensign Brooks stated "I can see pagoda masts. I see the biggest meatball flag on the biggest battleship I ever saw!" The Yamato alone displaced as much as all units of Taffy 3 combined. Within three minutes, the US units were under heavy fire from Kurita's Center Force and the Battle off Samar was thus joined.

Immediately, Clifton Sprague directed his carriers to turn to launch their aircraft and withdraw towards a squall to the east, hoping that bad visibility would reduce the accuracy of Japanese gunfire, and ordered the destroyers to create smoke to mask the retreating carriers which drew fire from the Japanese ships.

In an action that author James D. Hornfisher would call “The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors,” Lieutenant Commander Ernest E. Evans, CO of the destroyer Johnston, which was the closest to the attackers, took the initiative. He ordered his ship to "flank speed, full left rudder," ordering Johnston to directly attack the vastly superior oncoming Japanese ships on his own in what would appear to be a suicidal mission.

The Johnston was a Fletcher-class destroyer, a much smaller class than cruisers or battleships. Its five 5-inch guns, depth charges, and multiple antiaircraft weapons were designed to be effective against ground troops, aircraft, and submarines, but not against armoured battleships or cruisers, and their lack of armour to withstand shellfire led to the nickname "tin cans". Only the Johnston’s ten Mark-15 torpedoes housed in two 5-tube launchers could sink a battleship, but only if launched within a range of five miles, well within range of enemy gunfire. Had Johnston withdrawn, every escort carrier of Taffy 3 would have been destroyed due to the opposing force’s superior speed and armament. Evans therefore decided to take the chance that they might survive a charge and score a lucky hit.

Weaving to avoid shells, and steering towards splashes, the Johnston approached the cruiser squadron flagship, the heavy cruiser Kumano, for a torpedo run. At a range of 10 miles (20 km), Johnston engaged Kumano with gunfire, aiming for bridge and deck since the 5-inch shells would have bounced off the enemy ship's belt armour. At the same time, Johnston proceeded to close within torpedo range and fired off a salvo, which blew the bow off Kumano, also taking the Mogami-class heavy cruiser Suzuya out of the fight as she stopped to assist.

At a range of seven miles, the battleship Kongo sent a 14-inch shell through the Johnston’s deck and engine room, reducing Johnston’s speed by half to 14 knots and interrupting electric power to the aft gun turrets. Then three 6-inch shells, possibly from Yamato, struck Johnston’s bridge, causing numerous casualties and wounding Captain Evans in his left hand. The bridge was abandoned and Evans proceeded to steer the ship back towards the fleet from the aft steering column, when he noticed the other destroyers starting to engage the enemy, too.

Emboldened by Johnston’s attack, Sprague gave the order "small boys attack", sending the rest of Taffy 3's destroyers on the assault. Despite the heavy damage, Evans turned the Johnston around and reentered the fight while damage control teams restored power to two of the three aft turrets.

The other destroyers attacked the Japanese line, drawing fire and scattering the Japanese formations as ships turned to avoid torpedoes. The Yamato found herself between two torpedoes fired from the destroyer Heermann which were on parallel courses, and for ten minutes, she headed away from the action, unable to turn back for fear of being hit. Heermann, meanwhile, engaged the other Japanese battleships at such a close range that they could not return fire for either inability to sufficiently depress their guns or for fear of hitting their own units.

At 07:35, the even smaller destroyer escort Samuel B. Roberts turned and headed toward the battle, passing by the damaged Johnston that had left. The Roberts had only two 5-inch guns, one fore and aft, and just three Mark-15 torpedoes but still proceeded to attack the heavy cruiser Chokai. With smoke as cover, the Roberts steamed to within two and a half miles of Chokai, coming under fire of the latter’s two forward 8-inch turrets.

But Roberts was so close that the shells passed overhead. Once in torpedo range, Roberts salvo of three torpedoes struck the cruiser, and then the Roberts dueled with the Japanese ships for an hour, firing over 600 5-inch shells, and firing at Chokai’s superstructure with 40 mm Bofors and 20 mm anti-aircraft guns while maneuvering at close range. At 08:51, the Japanese finally landed two hits, the second of which destroyed the aft gun turret. With her remaining 5-inch gun, Roberts set the bridge of the cruiser Chikuma afire and destroyed the number 3 gun turret, before being pierced again by three 14 inch shells from Kongo. With a 40-foot hole in her side, the Roberts took on water, and at 09:35, the order was given to abandon the ship that sank 30 minutes later with 89 of her crew. She would go down in history as “The destroyer escort that fought like a battleship.”

Meanwhile, Sprague had ordered all three Taffy groups to launch their planes with whatever weapons loadout available, even if that were only machine guns or depth charges. Even after many aircraft expended their ammo and ordnance, they made dry runs to threaten and distract the Japanese warships and their gunners.

Heermann, in a position of comparative safety on the disengaged side of the carriers at the start of the fight, steamed into the action at flank speed through the formation of “baby flattops” who, after launching their last planes, formed a rough circle as they turned toward Leyte Gulf. Smoke and intermittent rain squalls had meanwhile reduced visibility to less than 100 yards (90 metres), causing Heermann to back emergency full to avoid collision with the destroyer escort Samuel B. Roberts and later the destroyer Hoel as she formed column on the screen flagship in preparation of a torpedo attack.

Initiating the run, Heermann engaged the heavy cruiser Chikuma with her 5 inch guns while directing a torpedo attack at Haguro. After firing two torpedoes, Heermann changed course to engage a column of four battleships that had commenced firing upon her. She trained her guns on the battleship Kongo, the column's leader, and launched three torpedoes. Then she quickly closed on the battleship Haruna, the target of her last three torpedoes, which were launched from a mere 4,400 yards (4000 metres). Believing that one of the torpedoes had hit the battleship, she managed to avoid the salvoes which splashed in her wake as she retired. Japanese records claim that the battleship successfully evaded all of the torpedoes from Heermann, but they were slowed down in their pursuit of the American carriers. The Yamato, with her enormous 18.1 inch guns was forced out of the action altogether when, caught between two spreads, she reversed course for almost 10 minutes to escape being hit.

Heermann sped to the starboard quarter of the carrier formation to lay more concealing smoke and then charged back into the fight a few minutes later, placing herself between the escort carriers and the column of four enemy heavy cruisers. Here she engaged Japanese cruiser Chikuma in a duel which seriously damaged both ships. A series of 8 inch hits flooded the forward part of the US destroyer, pulling her bow down so far that her anchors were dragging in the water while one of her guns was knocked out. The cruiser also came under heavy air attack during the engagement. Under the combined effect of Heermann’s guns and the bombs, torpedoes, and strafing from carrier-based planes, Chikuma finally disengaged but sank during her attempted withdrawal.

As Chikuma turned away, the heavy cruiser Tone turned her guns on Heermann, who returned fire until she reached a position suitable to resume laying smoke for the carriers. At this point planes from Admiral Felix Stump's "Taffy 2" swooped in to damage Tone so severely that she too broke off action and withdrew. The attacks of the destroyers and aircraft thus saved the outgunned task groups.

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The carriers of Taffy 3 turned south and withdrew through shellfire. The armor-piercing (AP) shells intended for Halsey's battleships flew right through the unarmoured escort carriers without triggering their fuses. A switch to High Explosive (HE) shells holed, slowed, and sunk USS Gambier Bay at the rear, while most of the others were also damaged. Their single stern-mounted 5-inch (127 mm) anti-aircraft guns returned fire, though they were ineffective against surface ships. Yet, USS St. Lo scored a hit on the magazine of a cruiser, the only known hit inflicted directly by a gun on an aircraft carrier against an opposing surface vessel.

Two hours into the attack, Captain Evans aboard the Johnston spotted a line of four Japanese destroyers led by the light cruiser Yahagi making a torpedo attack on the fleeing carriers and moved to intercept. Johnston engaged the attacking group with gunfire, forcing them to prematurely fire their torpedoes and miss the carriers. Their gunfire then turned to the weaving Johnston. At 09:10, the Japanese scored a direct hit on one of the forward turrets, knocking it out and setting off many 5-inch shells that were stored in the turret. Her damaged engines stopped, leaving her dead in the water. While the opposition closed in on the disabled destroyer, Johnston was hit so many times that one survivor recalled "they couldn't patch holes fast enough to keep her afloat." At 09:45 (2 hours and 45 minutes into the battle), Captain Evans finally gave the order to abandon ship. The Johnston sank 25 minutes later with 186 of her crew. Captain Evans abandoned ship with his crew, but was never seen again. He was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.

Steaming about 60 miles east of Samar before dawn 25 October, St. Lo launched a 4-plane anti-submarine patrol while the remaining carriers of Taffy 3 prepared for the day’s initial air strikes against the landing beaches. The Battle off Samar began at 06:47 when Ensign Bill Brooks, piloting one of the ASW planes from St. Lo, reported sighting a large Japanese force comprising four battleships, six heavy and light cruisers, and ten to twelve destroyers approaching from the westnorthwest, only 17 miles away. At the same time, lookouts on St. Lo spotted the characteristic pagoda-like superstructures of Japanese battleships on the horizon. Admiral Sprague ordered "Taffy 3" to turn south at flank speed. Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita’s force steadily closed and opened fire on Taffy 3 around 06:58.

St. Lo and the other five CVEs dodged in and out of rain squalls and managed to launch all available fighter and torpedo planes with whatever armament they had handy (general purpose bombs, rockets, machine guns, and even depth charges.) The carriers chased salvos from enemy cruisers and battleships, and ordered the pilots “to attack the Japanese task force and proceed to Tacloban airstrip, Leyte, to rearm and refuel". As salvoes fell increasingly nearer St. Lo, her planes continued to strike the enemy force with bombs, rockets, and gunfire, then make dry runs after their armament was expended.

By 07:38, the Japanese cruisers, approaching from St. Lo’s port quarter, had closed to within 14,000 yards. St. Lo responded to their salvoes with rapid fire from her single 5-inch gun, claiming three hits on a Tone-class cruiser.

For the next hour and a half, Admiral Kurita's ships closed in on Taffy 3, with his nearest destroyers and cruisers firing from as close as 10,000 yards on the port and starboard quarters of the St. Lo. Many salvoes straddled the ship, landed close aboard, or passed directly overhead. Throughout the running gun battle, the carriers and their escorts were laying a particularly effective smoke screen that Admiral Sprague credited with greatly inhibiting the Japanese gunfire accuracy. Even more effective were the attacks by the destroyers and destroyer escorts at point-blank range against the Japanese destroyers and cruisers. All the while, Kurita's force was under incessant attack by Taffy 3 aircraft and planes from the two other US carrier units to the south.

At 09:15, the Japanese destroyers which had been engaged by USS Johnston launched a premature torpedo attack on the escort carriers from 10,500 yards. The torpedoes were reaching end-of-run as they approached their target, broaching the surface. An Avenger torpedo bomber from St. Lo, piloted by Lieutenant Junior Grade Waldrop, strafed and exploded two torpedoes in the wake of sister ship USS Kalinin Bay.

Under heavy attack from the air and incessant fire from American destroyers and destroyer escorts, the Japanese cruisers broke off action and turned northward at 09:20.

Kalinin Bay accelerated to flank speed; and, despite fire from three enemy cruisers, launched her planes, ordering the pilots "to attack the Japanese task force and proceed to Tacloban airstrip, Leyte, to rearm and refuel." As salvos fell increasingly nearer Kalinin Bay, her planes, striking the enemy force with bombs, rockets, and gunfire, inflicted heavy damage on the closing ships.

As the trailing ship in the escort carrier van, Kalinin Bay came under intense enemy fire. Though partially protected by chemical smoke, by a timely rain squall, and by counterattacks of screening destroyers and destroyer escorts, she took the first of 15 direct hits at 07:50. Fired from an enemy battleship, the large caliber shell (14 inch or 16 inch) struck the starboard side of the hangar deck just abaft the forward elevator.

By 08:00, the Japanese cruisers, which were steaming off her port quarter, closed to within 18,000 yards. Kalinin Bay responded to their straddling salvoes with rapid fire from her single 5-inch gun, to which the opposing force reacted with intensified fire. Three 8-inch armour-piercing projectiles struck her within minutes of each other. At 08:25, the carrier scored a direct hit from 16,000 yards on the No. 2 turret of a Nachi-class heavy cruiser, and a second hit shortly thereafter forced the Japanese ship to withdraw temporarily from formation.

At 08:30, five Japanese destroyers steamed over the horizon off her starboard quarter. The closing ships opened fire from about 14,500 yards; and, as screening ships engaged the cruisers and laid down concealing smoke, Kalinin Bay shifted her fire and for the next hour traded shots with the guns of Japan's Destroyer Squadron 10. Though no destroyer fire hit Kalinin Bay directly, she took ten more 8-inch hits from the now obscured cruisers. One shell passed through the flight deck and into the communications area, where it destroyed all radar and radio equipment.

At 09:15, an Avenger torpedo-bomber from the doomed St. Lo strafed and exploded two torpedoes in Kalinin Bay’s wake about 100 yards astern, and a shell from the latter's 5 inch gun deflected a third from a collision course with her stern.

At about 09:30, as the Japanese ships fired parting salvoes and reversed course northward, Kalinin Bay scored a direct hit amidships on a retreating destroyer. Five minutes later she ceased fire and retired southward with the surviving ships of "Taffy 3." At 1050 the task unit came under a concentrated air attack. During the 40-minute battle the first attack from a Kamikaze unit in World War II, all escort carriers but Fanshaw Bay were damaged. One plane of Lt. Yukio Seki's Shikishima squadron crashed through St. Lo’s flight deck and exploded her torpedo and bomb magazine, inflicting terminal damage. Four diving planes attacked Kalinin Bay from astern and the starboard quarter, two of which were shot down close aboard, while a third plane crashed into the port side of the flight deck, damaging it severely. The fourth hit destroyed the aft port stack.

Kalinin Bay suffered extensive structural damage during the morning's intense action, as well as five dead among her 60 casualties. Twelve direct hits were later confirmed by damage plus two large caliber near misses. Ironically, it was the two near misses that exploded under her counter that threatened the ship's survival.

Taken under 5 inch gunfire by the destroyers and destroyer escorts, the Japanese cruiser Chokai was hit amidships, starboard side, most likely by the carrier USS Kalinin Bay. A secondary explosion caused by the armed torpedoes on her decks knocked out the engines and rudder. Chokai dropped out of formation.

Within minutes, an American aircraft dropped a 500 lb bomb on her forward machinery room. Fires began to rage around the Chokai and she went dead in the water. Later that day she was scuttled by torpedoes from the destroyer Fujinami.

After the destroyer USS Johnston put a Mk-15 torpedo into the Kumano, blowing off her bow, she retired towards the San Bernadino strait where she suffered minor damage from aerial attack.

The Chikuma engaged the U.S. escort carriers, helping to sink Gambier Bay, but came under fire from the American destroyer Heermann and heavy air attack. Chikuma inflicted severe damage on Heermann, but was soon hit by an aerial torpedo attack and immobilized. Her crew was taken off by the destroyer Nowaki and Chikuma was scuttled in the late morning of on 25 October 1944. While withdrawing from the battle area, Nowaki was herself sunk, with the loss of all but one of Chikuma’s surviving crewmen.

Though many of Kurita's ships had not been damaged, the air and destroyer attacks had broken up his formations, and he had lost tactical control. The ferocity of the determined, concentrated sea and air attack from Taffy 3 had already sunk or crippled the heavy cruisers Chōkai, Kumano, and Chikuma. Signals from Ozawa had disabused him of the notion that he was attacking the whole of the 3rd Fleet, which meant that the longer he continued to engage, the more likely it was that he would suffer devastating air strikes from Halsey's main attack carriers which were even more threatening than the tiny force of Taffy 3.

Calculating that the fight was not worth further losses, Kurita broke off the engagement at 09:20 with the order: "all ships, my course north, speed 20". As he retreated north and then west through the San Bernardino Strait, the smaller and heavily damaged American force continued to press the battle. (While watching the Japanese retreat, Sprague heard a nearby sailor exclaim: "Damn it, boys, they're getting away!";) In retreat, Nagato, Haruna and Kongo were severely damaged from the torpedoes of Taffy 3's "tin can" destroyers and escorts.

When Admiral Halsey got word, his carriers and battleships turned back to pursue Kurita but the Japanese forces had already escaped.

Tactically, the Japanese had succeeded in luring Halsey's force away, leaving only light forces standing in their way. Admiral Kurita's battleships and cruisers were in a good position to cause serious damage to US troops and supplies which would have potentially delayed their invasion of the Philippines. Despite earlier losses and sacrifices in the Leyte campaign, the Japanese managed to have victory within reach.

But the Japanese were unable to exploit this opportunity. Taffy 3 had turned back the most powerful surface fleet which Japan had sent to sea since the Battle of Midway. Domination of the skies, superior seamanship, and prudent, timely maneuvers, and tactical errors by the Japanese Admiral helped to nullify the overwhelming odds against the American task force. Of all of the battles in the Pacific War, this best demonstrates the potency of aircraft versus surface ships.

From a tactical standpoint, the lopsided battle had resulted in Americans losing one escort carrier (Gambier Bay), two destroyers (Hoel and Johnston), one destroyer escort (Samuel B. Roberts) sunk, and dozens of aircraft. Four other U.S. destroyers were damaged. Over a thousand American sailors and pilots gave their lives that day. (Remarkably, the destroyer Heermann finished the battle with only six of her crew dead, despite her duel with Japanese battleships many times her size.)

Against this, the Japanese were forced to scuttle three heavy cruisers, and one limped back seriously damaged without a bow.

More importantly, this ended Japanese attempts to defend the Philippines by sea, which would cut off their Navy's supply of oil in Southeast Asia. Compounded with their losses in the earlier battles of the Leyte campaign, the surviving ships of the fleet returned to Japan where they would mostly sit out the remainder of the war.

Taffy 3 was awarded a Presidential Unit Citation "For extraordinary heroism in action against powerful units of the Japanese Fleet during the Battle off Samar, Philippines, October 25, 1944. ...the gallant ships of the Task Unit waged battle fiercely against the superior speed and fire power of the advancing enemy ...two of the Unit's valiant destroyers and one destroyer escort charged the battleships point-blank and, expending their last torpedoes in desperate defense of the entire group, went down under the enemy's heavy shells ... The courageous determination and the superb teamwork of the officers and men who fought the embarked planes and who manned the ships of Task Unit 77.4.3 were instrumental in effecting the retirement of a hostile force threatening our Leyte invasion operations and were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service." ^[1]

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