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Battle of Ilipa
Part of the Second Punic War
Date 206 BC Location Ilipa (or Silpia), ten miles north of modern Seville, Spain Result Decisive Roman victory; Carthaginian hold on Spain forever broken
Combatants
Carthage	Roman Republic
Commanders
Mago Barca Hasdrubal Gisco Masinissa	Scipio Africanus Major
Strength
54,000-70,000 men, Plus Numidian and Spaniard allies	approx 43,000 men, Roman and Spanish allies
Casualties
Entire army destroyed	Unknown

Second Punic War

Saguntum – Lilybaeum – Ticinus – Trebia – Cissa – Lake Trasimene – Ebro River – Ager Falernus – Geronium – Cannae – 1st Nola – Dertosa – 2nd Nola – Cornus – 3rd Nola – Beneventum – 1st Tarentum – 1st Capua – Silarus – 1st Herdonia – Syracuse – Upper Baetis – 2nd Capua – 2nd Herdonia – Cartagena – Numistro – Asculum – Tarentum – Baecula – Grumentum – Metaurus – Ilipa – Crotona – Bagbrades – Cirta – Po Valley – Great Plains – Zama

The Battle of Ilipa was arguably Scipio Africanus’s most brilliant victory in his military career during the Second Punic War. Though it may not seem to be as original as Hannibal’s tactic in Cannae, Scipio's pre-battle maneuver and his Reverse Cannae formation was still a culmination of his tactical ability, in which he forever broke the Carthaginian hold in Spain, thus denying any further land invasion into Italy and a rich base for the Barca Dynasty both in silver and manpower.

Contents 1 Prelude 2 Pre-Battle Maneuver 3 Battle 4 After-Battle Maneuvers 5 Aftermath 6 References

After the Battle of Baecula and Hasdrubal Barca's departure, further Carthaginian reinforcements were landed in Spain in early 207 BC under Hanno, who soon joined Mago Barca. Together they were raising a powerful army by heavy recruiting of Celtiberians. Meanwhile, Hasdrubal Gisco also advanced his army from Gades into Andalusia, thus Scipio was facing two concentrated enemy forces, one of which would no doubt fall upon his rear if he tried to attack the other.

After careful planning, Scipio decided to send a detachment under Silanus to strike Mago first. Marching with great speed Silanus was able to achieve complete surprise when he fell on the Carthaginian camps, which resulted in the dispersion of Mago's Celtiberians and the capture of Hanno.

Thus Hasdrubal was left alone in facing Scipio's concentrated force, but the Carthaginian general was able to avoid battle by splitting his troops among fortified cities. The campaign of 207 BC in Spain was ended without any further major action.

The next spring the Carthaginians launched their last great effort to recover their Spanish holdings. Mago was joined at Ilipa by Hasdrubal Gisco, creating a force estimated at 54,000 to 70,000, considerably larger than Scipio’s army of 43,000 men which was composed of a large number of Spanish allies who were not as experienced as Roman legionaries.

Upon the arrival of the Romans, Mago unleashed a daring attack on the Roman camp with most of his cavalry, under his Numidian ally Masinissa. However this was foreseen by Scipio, who had concealed his own cavalry behind a hill, which charged into the Carthaginian flank, and threw back the enemy with heavy losses on Mago’s side.

The two opponents spent the next few days observing and testing each other, with Scipio always waiting to lead out his troops only after the Carthaginians had advanced from their camp first. The Roman formation always presented the legions in the center and Spaniards on the wings, thus leading Hasdrubal and Mago to believe that this would be the Roman arrangement on the day of battle. This would be a fatal assumption.

Believing his deception had taken firm hold of the Carthaginian commanders, Scipio made his move. First he ordered the army to be fed and armed before daylight. He then promptly sent his cavalry and light troops against the Carthaginian outposts at daybreak while advancing with his main force behind, all the way to the front of the Carthaginian position. This day his legions stood at the wings and the Spaniards in the centre.

Surprised by the sudden attacks by the Romans, the Carthaginians rushed to arm themselves and sallied forth without breakfast. Still believing that Scipio would arrange his force in the earlier fashion, Hasdrubal deployed his elite Africans in the centre and Spanish mercenaries on his wings and was not able to change formation after he discovered the new Roman arrangement for the offending army was too close.

For the next few hours Scipio held back his infantry behind the skirmishing light troops and thus amplified the effect of the missed breakfast on his enemy. When he finally decided to attack, the light troops were called back to position themselves behind the legions on the wings, then the main advance began. With his wings advancing at a faster pace than the Spanish in his center Scipio formed a concave, or Reversed Cannae, battle line. Furthermore, the Roman general expanded his wings by ordering the light troops to the flanks of the legionaries, and the cavalry to the flank of the light troops, thus enveloping the whole Carthaginian line on both sides.

Still refusing his center, Scipio’s legions, light troops, and cavalry attacked the half-trained Spaniards on the Carthaginian wings from front, flank, and rear respectively. The Carthaginian center was helpless to reinforce its wings with the threat of the Spanish force that was looming large in close distance but not yet attacking.

With the inevitable destruction of its wings, the Carthaginian center was further demoralized and confused by the trampling of their own maddened elephants which were being driven towards the center by the Roman cavalry attacking the flanks. Combined with hunger and fatigue, the Carthaginians started to withdraw, at first in good order. But as Scipio now pressed his advantage by ordering his Spanish center into battle, the Carthaginians crumbled, and a massacre which may have rivaled the one in Cannae was only averted by a sudden downpour, which brought a hold to all actions on the field, and enabled the remaining Carthaginians to seek refuge in their camp.

Although temporarily safe in their camp, the Carthaginians were not able to make rest. Facing the inevitable Roman attack the next morning they were obliged to strengthen their defenses. But as more and more Spanish mercenaries deserted the Carthaginians as night drew forward Hasdrubal tried to slip away with his Africans in darkness.

But Scipio was not to repeat the mishap in Baecula. He immediately ordered a pursuit. Led by the cavalry, the whole Roman army was hot on Hasdrubal’s tail. When the Romans finally caught up with the Carthaginian host the butchery began, which left Hasdrubal with only 6,000 men, who then fled onto a mountain top without any water supply. This remnant of Carthaginian army surrendered a short time later, but not before Hasdrubal and Mago had made good their escape.

After the battle, Hasdrubal Gisco departed for Africa to visit the powerful Numidian king Syphax, in whose court he was met by Scipio, who was also courting the favor of the Numidians.

Mago Barca fled to the Balearics, from whence he would sail to Liguria and attempt an invasion of northern Italy.

After his final subjugation of Carthaginian Spain and revenge upon the Spanish chieftains, whose betrayal had led to the death of his father and uncle, Scipio returned to Rome. He was elected consul of 205 BC with an unanimous nomination, and with the Scipiones and their allies now in power, he would have the control of Sicily as proconsul, from where his invasion of the Carthaginian homeland would be realized.

• B.H. Liddell Hart; Scipio Africanus: greater than Napoleon; 1926; ISBN 0-306-80583-9
• Nigel Bagnall; The Punic Wars; 1990; ISBN 0-312-34214-4
• Polybius; The Rise of the Roman Empire; Trans. Ian Scott-Kilvert; 1979; ISBN 0-14-044362-2
• Serge Lancel; Hannibal; Trans. Antonia Nevill; 2000; ISBN 0-631-21848-3