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Battle of Canusium
Part of the Second Punic War
Date 209 BC Location Canusium, Apulia, Italy Result Indecisive
Combatants
Carthage	Roman Republic
Commanders
Hannibal	Marcellus
Strength
unknown	approximately 20,000
Casualties
reportedly 8,000 killed	more than 5,700 killed

v • d • e Second Punic War

Saguntum – Lilybaeum – Rhone – Ticinus – Trebia – Cissa – Lake Trasimene – Ebro River – Ager Falernus – Geronium – Cannae – 1st Nola – Dertosa – 2nd Nola – Cornus – 3rd Nola – Beneventum – 1st Tarentum – 1st Capua – Silarus – 1st Herdonia – Syracuse – Upper Baetis – 2nd Capua – 2nd Herdonia – Numistro – Asculum – 2nd Tarentum – Baecula – Grumentum – Metaurus – Ilipa – Crotona – Utica – Great Plains – Cirta – Po Valley – Zama

v • d • e Punic Wars
First – Mercenary – Second – Third

The battle of Canusium was a three days engagement between forces of Rome and Carthage, that took place in Apulia during the summer of 209 BC, the tenth year of the Hannibal's war. It was a part of a larger Roman offensive aiming at subjugation and punishment of the cities and tribes, which had abandoned the alliance with Rome since the battle of Cannae, and narrowing the base of the Carthaginian leader Hannibal in southern Italy. The battle of Canusium was also an episode of the years long contest between Hannibal and the Roman general Marcus Claudius Marcellus for control over that territory. As neither of the sides managed to gain a decisive victory and both suffered considerable losses (up to 14,000 killed overall, according to primary sources) the outcome of this engagement was open to differing interpretations by both ancient and modern historians. While Marcellus took a heavy blow at Canusium, he nevertheless checked for some time the movements of the main Punic forces and thus contributed for the successes, achieved at the same time by other Roman commanders against Hannibal's allies in Magna Graecia and Lucania.

Contents 1 Antecedents: Rome on the offensive 2 The three days battle 3 Consequences: Hannibal on the defensive 4 Footnotes 5 References

Since the beginning of the Carthaginian invasion in 218 BC Rome invested more and more resources at first to protect Italy and then to regain the territories lost to Hannibal. This was particularly visible in terms of manpower. The number of the legions grew steadily despite and even accelerated by the sanguinary routs, suffered in the initial stage of the war (see the articles on the battles of the Trebia, Lake Trasimene, and Cannae), so that in 210 BC - the year before the clash at Canusium - there were 21 legions at Rome's disposal^[1]. Some of them were operating against Carthaginians and their allies in Sicily, Sardinia, Iberia and Greece, but the most were placed in various parts of Italy which was still the primary battlefield of the Second Punic war.

• See a map of western Mediterranean in 218 BC, from Shepherd's Historical Atlas (1911 edition)

Since Cannae the Romans adopted the recommendations of their statesman Quintus Fabius Maximus, who tought them to evade general confrontations with Hannibal in order to preserve their own strength and to gradually diminish that of the enemy by wearing him out in series of smaller engagements and sieges (see Fabian strategy). As evidenced by the unceasing sequence of defeats (e. g. the battle of Herdonia in 212 BC), this strategy was not followed literally. One of the generals who did not comply with it completely was Marcellus. He had distinguished himself before the Punic invasion as a conqueror of Cisalpine Gaul but gained even more prominence in the immediate aftermath of the battle of Cannae, when he repeatedly denied Hannibal's entrance in Nola and thus kept the Roman grip on Campania in spite of Capua's defection^[2].

Marcellus' military merits (further increased by the capture of Syracuse) earned him a place among the other seasoned commanders, such as Fabius Maximus, Quintus Fulvius Flaccus and Appius Claudius, whom the Roman people preferred as leaders, expecting that they would make up for the superior quality of the Carthaginian commanding staff^[3]. The Carthaginan general found it increasingly difficult to cope with such adversaries until in 211 BC the Romans captured Capua, his major ally in Italy^[4]. After the reconquest of Campania Rome sent its armies to the south and east to attack the other cities that had forsaken it for the Carthaginian cause. In 210 BC Marcellus, elected consul for the fourth time, subdued several places in Samnium and Apulia, destroying their Carthaginian garrisons^[5][6], and fought Hannibal in an indecisive battle at Numistro.^[7][8] The next target of the Roman offensive was Tarentum, the main Greek city of southern Italy, that had switched sides several years ago in favour of Hannibal.

Tarentum's turn came in 209 BC. Its retaking was the priority of Fabius, who took up the consulship for that year. To his colleague, Q. Fulvius Flaccus, and to Marcellus, now a proconsul, fell the obligation to engage Hannibal so as to prevent any outside assistance to the city that was to be besieged. Each of the three generals had an army of two legions, added by allied contingents. Whilst Fabius advanced to Tarentum, Fulvius marched into Lucania. The third army under Marcellus fought in Apulia. A fourth not insignificant force was ordered by Fabius to attack the Bruttian allies of Hannibal from Regium.^[9][10][11]

• See a map of ancient southern Italy from Shepherd's Historical Atlas (1911 edition)

It was Marcellus’ lot to confront Hannibal directly, for the Carthaginian general chose Apulia for his main operations after the end of the winter. Hannibal made the first move by encamping near Canusium, hoping to persuade its inhabitants to break their allegiance to Rome. Canusium was not far from Salapia, a town whose Numidian garrison had been betrayed to and slaughtered by Marcellus in the preceding year, so Hannibal’s intention was to restore his influence in the area^[12]. As soon as the proconsul approached though, the Carthaginian moved away from Canusium. The loss of the Numidian contingent in Salapia had deprived Hannibal of one of his advantages over the Romans – the skillful and numerous cavalry^[5], so the open and flat terrain was no longer favorable to engage them as it was at the times of Cannae. That is why Hannibal retreated, endeavouring to lure Marcellus in an ambush when an opportunity occurred. By relentless pursuit the latter did force the Carthaginians to fight. Hannibal tried in vain to escape by a night march and his light troops were pressed hard, when they tried to repel the legionaries from the unfinished fortifications of the Carthaginian camp. The initial skirmishes grew to a general battle which ended only when the night fell and allowed the both sides to disengage and then fortify their camps.^[10]

On the next day Hannibal decided to stand his ground and in the renewed fighting the Romans were heavily beaten. One of the wings of the first battle line, composed of allied levies, was forced to give ground. Marcellus ordered the legion, positioned in the rear, to move forward and relieve the retreating allies. This proved to be an error, because the ensuing manoeuvre and the continuing advance of the enemy caused disarray of the whole army. The Romans were put to flight and 2,700 of them were killed before the rest could take refuge behind the palisade of the camp.^[10][13]

Marcellus was not daunted by this setback and although many of his men were wounded he led them to yet another long and undecided fight on the third day. Hannibal's elite Iberian troops were unable to break the Romans so the Carthaginian brought up his war elephants. At first they produced the desired effect by trampling and scattering the Roman front, but a successful counterstrike by a maniple of hastati turned the beasts against their own troops and caused disorder among their ranks. Marcellus seized the opportunity and threw his cavalry, kept so far in reserve, into the action. The cavalry charge was followed by an all-out advance of the legions that the Carthaginians could not resist. This time they retreated to their camp with heavy losses. The toll on Marcellus' troops was even heavier than that of the preceding day (3,000 killed and many wounded), so he declined to pursue Hannibal when the latter broke up his camp and marched south in the following night.^[13][14]

As a result of the battle of Canusium the army of Marcellus was effectively put out of action. Sparing his soldiers, most of whom were wounded, the proconsul retired to Campania, where he spent inactive the rest of the summer, allowing Hannibal to traverse southern Italy unchecked. This prompted Marcellus' political enemies in Rome to accuse him of bad generalship and to ask the people and the Senate to relieve him from his command. Nevertheless Marcellus was elected consul once again and was authorized to seek a decisive engagement with Hannibal in the following year.^[13][15]

Still in the summer of 209 BC, while Marcellus was fighting Hannibal in Apulia, the army under the consul Quintus Fulvius Flaccus effected the submission of Lucania. The other consul, Quintus Fabius Maximus, came to Tarentum.^[11][16] Having disentangled himself from Marcellus, Hannibal hurried to the rescue of the city, but could not reach it in time. He was five miles away when Fabius sacked Tarentum.^[17][18] Faced with these abrupt losses of valuable allies, Hannibal had to retreat to the farthest corner of southeastern Italy, for Bruttium was also under Roman attack and some of its people invited Flaccus to receive their submission. Unopposed by the main Roman forces, the Carthaginian commander managed to intercept and destroy near Caulonia a 8,000 strong detachment, that had attacked the Bruttians from Regium^[11][18], and thus retained control over the region.

In the following year (208 BC) Hannibal confronted once again Marcellus in Apulia and this time was the last. Marcellus was killed in an ambush at Venusia and following his death Rome gave up the idea for a decisive encounter with Hannibal. After the battle of the Metaurus in 207 BC it was the turn for Hannibal to relinquish his hopes for regaining the military initiative. These events led to prolongation of the war in Italy until the Romans invaded the proper Carthaginian territory in northern Africa (see the articles about the battle of Crotona and the battle of Utica).

Note: All links to online sources were active on October 17th, 2007

Note: All links to online sources were active on October 17th, 2007

• Livius, Titus, The History of Rome, Vol. IV (ed. E. Rhys, translated by C. Roberts), University of Virginia Library Electronic Text Center
• Plutarch, The Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans, The Life of Marcellus (Dryden 1683 translation, Arthur Hugh Clough 1859 revision), available on Wikisource
• Smith, William (ed.), Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, University of Michigan
• Caven, Brian, The Punic Wars, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London 1980, ISBN 0 297 77633 9
• Кораблев, Илья, Ганнибал, Москва, "Наука", 1976, Студенческое научное общество
• Shepherd, William, Historical Atlas, New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1911 (part of Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection at the University of Texas Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin website)